Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants by Helman, Howard B.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 1 Summer 1967 Article 3
Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict
Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants
Howard B. Helman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Howard B. Helman, Pre-emption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 43 (1967).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol51/iss1/3
PRE-EMPTION: APPROACHING
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT OVER
LICENSING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
HowARD B. HELMAN*
Two seemingly unnoteworthy conditions in a certificate of the Pub-
lic Service Commission of Wisconsin authorizing the construction of a
nuclear power reactor bring into being the basis for a federal-state con-
troversy of major proportion.1
The conditions2 require: (1) the addition of a stored energy system
into the safety injection system of the nuclear reactor to assure system
operability in event of total loss of electric power; and (2) that con-
sideration be given to introducing neutron absorbing material in the
space below the core in the reactor vessel. Both conditions relate to the
adequacy of the design of the reactor from a safety standpoint. The
first condition seeks to assure operability of an existing engineered safe-
guard. It posits a reasonable safety objective and permits a practical
engineering design for compliance. The second condition appears di-
rected at the prevention of reforming of a critical mass of fuel in the
unlikely event of the melting of some portion of the core. While the
safety objective will not here be questioned, the method proposed for its
accomplishment is neither thought to be effective nor related to good
engineering design.
The wisdom of these conditions is not relevant to the potential con-
flict to be discussed; rather, the conditions are conveniently illustrative.
The Wisconsin-Michigan Power Company has filed with the United
States Atomic Energy Commission an application for a permit to con-
struct the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant.3 The Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin has not indicated an interest in participating
in the AEC proceeding.
The potential conflict between the State of Wisconsin and the federal
government arises from the exercise by each of regulatory authority
over the safety of nuclear power plants through separate licensing
actions. This author doubts the conflict will come to fruition because
attendant inconveniences will most likely be resolved amicably among
the parties. However, the context in which the potential controversy
arises, the increasing potentiality of a major conflict in this area, and
*B.A., B.E.E. Electrical Engineering, Union College, 1961; LLB., Columbia Uni-
versity, 1964; Finance Officer, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, United States
Agency for International Development.
'In the Matter of Wisconsin-Michigan Power Co., Docket No. CA-4689, 2-WP
2428, January 24, 1967.
2 Id. at 15, conditions 2 and 3.
3A.E.C. Docket No. 50-266.
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the sudden burgeoning of the nuclear power industry make it now ap-
propriate to set the relevant considerations in perspective.
There have been a few preludes to federal-state conflict over regu-
lation of the atom:
1. The Ravenswood Reactor
In December, 1962 Consolidated Edison Company of New York
announced the intention to construct a nuclear power plant at Ravens-
wood, New York, within metropolitan New York City.4 The plant was
to incorporate more extensive safeguards than previously proposed for
any reactor.5 There was enormous public opposition to the project. A
bill was introduced in the City Council prohibiting the construction of
a nuclear reactor within the city limits.' Before the bill was voted upon,
the matter was resolved by withdrawal of the application by Consoli-
dated Edison, ostensibly as the result of the purchase of low cost Cana-
dian hydroelectric power.7
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission commented upon
this proposed bill in a letter to the President of the City Council. In the
letter he stated :8
... the Atomic Energy Act establishes a comprehensive system
for regulation and control of uses of atomic energy. The Atomic
Energy Act and its legislative history express the congressional
intent that the control of the radiation hazards from certain
facilities, including nuclear reactors, be the exclusive responsi-
bility of the Federal Government.
2. The Jersey Central Reactor
The State of New Jersey, Department of Public Utilities, Board of
Utility Commissioners issued an interim order in the application of
Jersey Central Power and Light Company for authorization to con-
struct a nuclear power reactor at Oyster Creek, New Jersey which con-
tained the following finding:
4 See Nucleonics, January, 1963, at 17.
5 These included double containment, a boron-water injection system and dump
cooling.
G NEW YORK, N.Y., LAW 310 (1963).7 See NucLEoNics, February 1964, at 19.
S Letter of June 11, 1963 from AEC Chairman, Glenn T. Seaborg to City
Council President, Paul R. Screvane, AEC Press Release No. F-120, June
14, 1963, at 4-5.
"It should be noted that Article VII of the Agreement between AEC
and the State of New York for transfer of certain regulatory jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act provided that the
State and AEC would study the pre-emption question. This resulted
in a Memorandum of Understanding executed May 7, 1965 whereby AEC
is to furnish certain information to the State, and periodic meetings be-
tween AEC and the State are to be held. The State agreed to use its best
efforts to exempt activities regulated by AEC. The Memorandum spe
cifically disclaims any effect upon the rights of the State and of AEC
under the Constitution.
The State of Louisiana also entered into such a Memorandum of Under-
standing on April 17, 1967 in connection with its Section 274 Agreement,
because of concerns regarding the Tidelands Oil dispute.
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The federal Congress has pre-empted an area of nuclear reactor
regulation. However, it has also made clear that non-radiation
hazards connected with a reactor facility are proper subjects for
State regulation. The majority of the hazards which are the sub-ject of inquiry in this proceeding are of the non-radioactive type.
As to the few radiation hazards which are involved here, no
resolution of the possibility of a federal pre-emption need be
made. The parties are in substantial accord as to the safeguards
necessary to secure adequate protection against radiation hazards.
Therefore, the Board will not undertake to define the limits of
federal pre-emption, nor to dispose of unresolved constitutional
problems which this raisesf
The Board then ordered an oral argument regarding the exact nature
and scope of recommended and contemplated procedures with respect
to the monitoring of radioactive discharges from the plant to the atmos-
phere.Y0
3. Massachusetts Legislative Action
A bill has been introduced in 1966, and again in 1967 in the Massa-
chusetts House of Representatives requiring approval by the Depart-
ment of Public Health of "such portions [of any nuclear facility] as
may affect the environment or the public health, comfort and con-
venience."' '
The bill followed the report of a special commission appointed to
study the prospect of adopting regulatory and protective measures re-
lating to ionizing radiation.1 2 The report made the following comment
regarding entering into an agreement with the AEC for transfer of
certain licensing authority from AEC to the state pursuant to section
274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (hereafter the
Act).13
The main objection we have is that by such an agreement we
would possibly give the impression that we need some mandate
from the Atomic Energy Commission to protect people within
the borders of Massachusetts from the harmful effects of radia-
tion. The special Commission is firmly convinced that if any
dangerous situation is found within the boundaries of this state,
its Department of Health, with or without the approval of the
AEC, will take such measures as may be necessary to eliminate
the danger. (Emphasis supplied.)' 4
9 State of New Jersey, Department of Public Utilities, Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, In the Matter of Jersey Central Power and Light Co., In-
terim Order, Docket No. 652-60, November 15, 1965, at 15.
10 Id. at 16.
"3Commonwealth of Massachusetts, H.R. 70 (1966) ; H. R. 1721 (1967) ; An Act
Providing for the Protection of the Public Health as Related to Certain Nu-
clear Facilities.
"2Report on Regulatory and Protective Measures Pertaining to Ionizing Radia-
tion within the Commonwealth by the Special Commission created by Chapter
99 of the Resolves of 1963, MAss. Acrs & RESOLVES 1965, ch. 495, at 276.
"142 U.S.C. §2021 (Supp. III, 1958).
'4 Report, supra note 12, at 20. But cf., MICH. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 4073 at 1 (Oct.
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4. The Bodega Bay Case
In January 1963, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company filed with
AEC an application for a construction permit for a nuclear power re-
actor to be located at Bodega Head, California. 5 There was consider-
able public opposition to the project. Of particular concern from a
safety standpoint were matters relating to seismic activity.' 6
While the AEC proceeding was pending, a certificate was issued by
the California Public Utilities Commission, which would have permitted
construction to proceed upon issuance by AEC of the permit. The
Sierra Club petitioned for a reopening of the California proceeding for
the taking of additional evidence, including evidence relating to radio-
logical health and safety.
On March 17, 1964, the Supreme Court of the State of California
affirmed en banc the order of the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion denying the petition of the Sierra Club to reopen the proceedingsY
In answer to the question: "Has the federal government pre-empted
the question of the safety of the location of atomic reactors ?" the court
stated:
No... in view of subdivision (k) of section 2021 [274], the Cali-
fornia Utilities Commission] unquestionably has authority to in-
quire into safety questions apart from radiation hazards. Accord-
ingly, since the location of an atomic reactor at or near an active
earthquake fault zone involves safety considerations in addition
to radiation hazards, it is clear that the federal government has
not pre-empted the field, at least with respect to the phase of
protecting the public from hazards other than radiation hazards,
and that the States' powers in determining the location of atomic
reactors are not limited to matters of zoning or similar local
interests other than safety.
The decision says only that the states may regulate safety matters
related to non-radiological hazards associated with nuclear power
plants. Although the decision perhaps connotes that AEC has pre-
empted the regulation of safety in regard to radiological hazards associ-
ated with nuclear power plants, it has been carefully worded so as not
to state this conclusion.
31, 1962) : "A 'turn over agreement' is necessary so that the State of Michigan
may have control over radiation hazards arising out of the use of sources
of atomic energy defined under the Federal Atomic Energy Act."
See also, New York State Bar Ass'n Committee on Atomic Energy, State
Jurisdiction to Regulate Atomic Activities: Some Key Questions, at 3-5, (July
12, 1963).
5 Atomic Energy Commission, Doc. No. 50-205 (1963).
16 The application was withdrawn on November 12, 1964, when the AEC Regu-
latory Staff refused to support the application because of lack of demonstra-
tion of the design concept for withstanding differential ground motion. See
Summary Analysis by the Regulatory Staff, October 27, 1964.
17 Northern California Ass'n v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 61 Cal.2d 126, 390
P.2d 200 (1964).
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The foregoing cases evidence considerable disagreement regarding
what, if anything, has been pre-empted with respect to regulation of
radiological hazards associated with the use of ionizing radiation. The
disagreement may in part be explained because: (1) judicial guide-
lines with respect to pre-emption cannot yet be described as firmly
established; and (2) the recent evolution of activities utilizing ionizing
radiation has not afforded time for comprehension of the patterns that
are beginning to emerge. More detailed discussion of these two factors
is warranted.
I. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND RESTRICTIONS
UPON STATE ACTION
The doctrine of pre-emption emerges from article VI of the United
States Constitution, the "Supremacy" clause, which elevates federal law
above that of the states.'" But the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
limits the scope of federal enactments.' 9
As life and law have become more complex during the past one-
hundred-eighty years, considerable overlapping of authority between
the federal government and the states has developed. Conflicts have
arisen particularly in the areas of seditious conspiracy, labor-management
relations, and regulation of goods or services affecting interstate com-
merce.20 In simplest form, the states and the federal government may
assert jurisdiction over the same subject matter based upon distinct,
separate, and perhaps unrelated acts of sovereignty. 21 A common ex-
ample is that of the state seeking, under the police power, to regulate
quality, packaging, or method of handling of goods within the state
and the federal government seeking to regulate them as they affect
interstate commerce.22
The fact of actual or potential conflict between state and federal
acts of sovereignty does not foretell the mode of resolution. There is a
spectrum of possibilities and the guidelines for selection are expressed
in "terms of art" rather than those of technical precision. As stated
by the Supreme Court :23
38 "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land,
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
19 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
20 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson; 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S.
538 (1945) ; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
21 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
22 E.g., Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
23 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the
light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has
made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilibility; in-
consistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or
an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there
can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our pri-
mary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances
of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.
At one end of the spectrum, the state is precluded from legislating
in the area of actual or potential conflict. The subject matter is con-
sidered to be exclusively the object of federal activity, or alternatively,
federal activity has so pervasively encompassed the subject matter as
to preclude state action.24 This result would pertain even though the
federal government had not acted in the particular area, had not indi-
cated an intention to act, and the state enactment had not been intended
to be offensive to the pattern of federal action. 25
At the other end of the spectrum, the states would be free to act
until such time as it could be shown that there was actual conflict be-
tween state and federal authority, and that the state enactment was in-
consistent with realization of the federal objective. 26
In between, varying degrees of state action would be tolerated, per-
haps depending upon such factors as federal inaction ;27 compatibility
of objectives of state and federal programs ;28 need for the exercise of
authority and the unwillingness or inability of the federal government
to make provision therefore ;29 or the predominantly local nature of the
subject matter of action. 0
It is not here intended to present a comprehensive analysis of pre-
emption, distinguishing and explaining the myriad instants of conflict
that have arisen. Rather, the object is to provide a broad framework
within which the implications of federal-state conflict in regulation of
nuclear safety may be detailed.
Thus, in Cloverleaf Butter Company v. Patterson,31 wherein the
Supreme Court proscribed seizure by state officials of material intended
for incorporation into a product prepared for interstate commerce, the
Court reasoned:
24 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
25 Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-302 (1961).
26 Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
27 See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
28 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
29 See Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
30 See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
31315 U.S. 148, 155-156 (1942).
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Where this power to legislate exists it often happens that
there is only a partial exercise of that power by the federal gov-
ernment. In such cases the state may legislate freely upon those
phases of the commerce which are left unregulated by the nation.
But where the United States exercises its power of legislation
so as to conflict with a regulation of the state, either explicitly
or by implication, the state legislation becomes inoperative and
the federal legislation exclusive in its application.
When the prohibition of state action is not specific but in-
ferable from the scope and purpose of the federal legislation, it
must be clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with
those of the state to justify thwarting of state regulation.
And, in Campbell v. Hussey,32 the Court concludes:
Congress, in legislating concerning the type of tobacco
sold at auction, pre-empted the field and left no room for any
supplementary state regulation concerning those same types ....
We have then a case where the federal law excludes local
regulation, even though the latter does no more than supplement
the former. Under the definition of types or grades of tobacco
and the labeling which the Federal Government has adopted,
complementary state regulation is as fatal as state regulations
which conflict with the federal scheme.
However, in Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul,33 the Supreme Court
upheld a California statute which prohibited transportation or sale
within the state of avocados not meeting specified standards. The avo-
cados had been certified "mature" pursuant to federal regulations issued
under the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and had
been imported for sale. The Court reasoned:
The test of whether both federal and state regulations may oper-
ate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regu-
lations can be enforced without impairing the federal superin-
tendance of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or
different objectives. 34
In the field of labor-management relations, the cases have been
particularly numerous. The Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,35 upheld the authority of Congress to
enact broad legislation. In Hill v. Florida,36 a state statute requiring
licensing of union representatives was struck down because, to the
extent that it limited the union's choice of representatives, it interfered
with "the 'full freedom' of employees in collective bargaining." This
opened the door to broad interpretation of the scope of federal pre-
emption. But, where the conduct involved is marked by violence or
imminent threats to the public order, the Supreme Court has consistently
32368 U.S. 297, 301-302 (1961).
33373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
34But cf, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
35 301 U.S. 1 (1937).36325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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upheld state court awards of civil damages and the issuance of injunc-
tions.37 Hill v. Florida was followed by a series of cases trying to work
out a balance between state interests and federal prerogatives. These
were culminated by the Supreme Court decision in San Diego Building
& Trades Council v. Garmon,3s wherein the court espoused as a juris-
dictional standard, that subject matter arguably protected by section
7 or prohibited by section 8 may not be subject of state court action.
In recent decisions, the Court has had some difficulty adhering to this
standard.39
In three cases the Court has departed from finding pre-emption,
notwithstanding that the activity met the Garmon standard.40 These
were: (1) a suit to enforce a labor-management agreement pursuant to
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act;41 (2) a suit to
enjoin enforcement of an agency shop provision in a state having a right
to work law authorized by Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act ;42
and (3) a suit by an employer to recover damages for defamatory state-
ments published by a union during an organizing campaign. 43
1. Suit to enforce a provision of a labor-management agreement
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 44 creates a
right of action in federal court to enforce the provisions of a labor-
management agreement in an industry affecting commerce. The Court
merely states that this right may be exercised when the violation of the
agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice. The state court action is
upheld because Congress has established the same right of action in
federal court.
37 UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656(1954); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin
Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).38359 U.S. 236 (1959).
3 There have been fourteen decisions of the Supreme Court in this area since
Gannon:
Marine Engineers v. Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962) ; Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Local 438, Constr. & Gen.
Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,
373 U.S. 746 (1963); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963) ; Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S.
701 (1963) ; Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n Transit Workers v. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74 (1963); Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261(1964); Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades
Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964) ; Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252(1964); Local 1264, Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians v. Broadcast
Services of Mobile, 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Eng'rs. Beneficial Ass'n. 382 U.S. 181 (1965); Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
4o1n a fourth case, Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs. Beneficial
Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965), the Court permitted the state to enjoin picketing,
because a Board determination that the employees were in supervisory capaci-
ties removed them from the protection of the N.L.R.A.
41 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
42 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).43 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
4429 U.S.C. §185 (Supp. II, 1946).
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2. Suit to prevent violation of right to work law
The state injunction against the creation of an agency shop in vio-
lation of the state right to work law presented to the Supreme Court
the question whether a state remedy existed for violation of a state law,
where the state law was specifically excepted from the scope of pre-
emption by Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act; or whether a viola-
tion of that law be subject exclusively to redress by the National Labor
Relations Board, because the operation of Section 14(b) in conjunction
with state law made the conduct arguably an unfair labor practice.
Whether the labor-management agreement created an agency shop
was not thought to be in issue. The Court held that the state should
interpret its substantive law. Whether or not the state court could
afford a remedy was retained for reargument. 45 Had there been issue
over whether an agency shop was created, the Court might well have
felt that the federal interest in that question outweighed the value of
state interpretation of its substantive law.48
3. Damages for libel of an, employer
The award of damages by a state court for libel of an employer
during a union organizing campaign merely expands the exclusions
from the Garmon doctrine of matters peripheral to the concerns of the
L.M.R.A., where an important state interest is involved. However,
this seems a particularly damaging extension, because of the potenti-
ality of this form of action as a weapon against legitimate labor prac-
tices.4
7
The labor-management cases from Garmon to date are of particular
interest to the analysis of pre-emption and the atom. Garmon repre-
sents both the evolution and the birth of a broad standard for defining
the scope of federal pre-emption. The cases which followed depict the
judicial struggle to adhere to this standard, and provide insight into
the wrenching by competing interests that is necessary for erosion at
its edges. If not read too literally, this area affords useful precedent
for conflicts over regulation of the atom.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING PEACEFUL USES OF
ATOMIC ENERGY
Precedents in the area of pre-emption resolve conflicts through
ascertainment of the congressional intent in formulating the program
of federal action. But the creation of the technology which initiated
the need for federal regulation of peaceful uses of atomic energy was
undertaken by the federal government without the knowledge of Con-
45 On reargument, the Supreme Court held that the state could enforce its right
to work law, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
46 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
47 Note that in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme
Court recognizes the potentiality of this form of civil action to retard legiti-
mate criticism of public officials.
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gress. The birth of the "thing" to be controlled was a result of the secret
activities of the Manhattan Engineering District of the Army Corps of
Engineers during the Second World War. 48  When the war ended,
Congress was given an on-going program and the task of providing for
its future. The prime concern of Congress was the protection of com-
mon defense and security. Nevertheless, it was decided to establish
civilian control of the program through the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion,49 and a new feature was added: the Commission was directed to
encourage research and development efforts for the peaceful use of the
atom. Section la of the 1946 Act contains the following declaration:
Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people
of the United States that, subject at all times to the paramount
objective of assuring the common defense and security, the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practi-
cable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, in-
creasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition
in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.
The Commission was to own 50 all facilities which produced fission-
able materials.51 These production facilities were to be operated by the
Commission or through contract with the Commission.52 Fissionable
material was to be owned and controlled by the commission in like
manner, except that small quantities could be leased to private persons
for the conduct of research and development activities that did not have
potential for weapons development. 53 Radioactive materials coming out
of facilities producing or using fissionable material (by-product ma-
terial) 54 were owned by the Commission, but could be distributed under
license, for research or development activity, medical therapy or in-
dustrial uses, with the proviso that:
The Commission shall not distribute any byproduct materials
to any applicant and shall recall any distributed materials from
any applicant, who is not equipped to observe or who fails to
observe such safety standards to protect health as may be estab-
lished by the Commission or who uses such materials in violation
of law or regulation of the Commission or in a manner other
than as disclosed in the application therefor. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)55
48That is not to say that the existence of ionizing radiation was unknown.
Rather, it is the new applications of ionizing radiation and their potential for
enlarging the hazards associated with permitting use of ionizing radiation that
created the need for federal control.
49 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, §2, 42 U.S.C. §1801 (1946).
So Id. at §4(c) (1).
51Id. at §5(a) (1).
52Id. at §4(c) (2).
53ld. at §5(a) (2) ; Id. at §5(a) (4).
54Id. at §5(c) (1).
55ld. at §5(c) (2). Similar provisos are contained in §7(c) pertaining to the
issuance of licenses for commercial or industrial facilities; and in §3(a) per-
taining to the distribution of fissionable material. See also §4(c) (2).
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Even some source material5 could not be mined and transferred
without a license from the Commission.5"
Thus, one sees that under the 1946 Act, common defense and secur-
ity was the principal concern, and direct control, through contract,
the principal mode of operation. But where direct control was not con-
sistent with the Commission's new charter to encourage private research
and development, as was the case for materials disseminated to private
users and for non-production facilities, the Commission was directed to
make provision for common defense and security, and for safety,
through the licensing process.
Between 1946 and 1954 there was extensive development of peace-
ful use of atomic energy.58 Emphasis was placed upon the development
of prototype reactors, particularly for the naval nuclear propulsion pro-
gram. From these projects there emerged a new perspective regarding
the role of private industry in the utilization of atomic energy.
The new importance of private industrial development in the atomic
energy field was implemented in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which
introduced three major changes to the scheme of federal control. The
Act permitted: (1) private ownership and operation of utilization faci-
lities under license ;59 (2) private ownership of byproduct60 and source
material 61 under license; and (3) leasing of special nuclear material6 2
under license, with the added requirement that sufficient special nuclear
material be disseminated to encourage private research and develop-
ment.
63
These changes were intended to remove the spectre of exclusive
government control over development of peaceful use of atomic energy,
and to encourage the growth of private industrial capability. The transi-
tion from exclusive governmental development to private development
(the period since 1954 continues to be one of transition) is accompanied
by two major changes in emphasis regarding the need for regulating
use of the atom.
First, although AEC conducts a sizeable program of its own at
AEC facilities and through national laboratories operated under con-
561d. at §5(b) (1). Natural uranium and thorium defined.
57Id. at §5(b) (2). §5(b) (5) and §5(b) (6) authorized the Commission to guar-
antee purchase prices for source material and to conduct or permit exploration
for new reserves.
58 Townsend, The Atomic Power Program in the United States, ATOaS FOR
PowER 35, at 50-62 (1957).
59 "Utilization facility" is defined in Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §2014aa, 42
U.S.C. §2011 (1958). See also §§2131, 2133 and 2134. Note that "own" is
omitted from the list of functions for which a license is required.60 See §81, 42 U.S.C. §2111 (1964).
61 See §62, 42 U.S.C. §2092 (1964).
62 Fissionable and thermonuclear material. "Special nuclear material" is defined
in §11 (t), 42 U.S.C. §2014y (1964).
63Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2073 (1964); this section was amended in
1964, P.L. 88-489, to permit private ownership of special nuclear material.
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tract for AEC, the center for decision-making in regard to specific
projects has shifted from AEC to a multitude of individual users with
varying interests and requirements. 4 These users key their decisions
to factors of the marketplace, and are influenced in their planning by
AEC (except for matters relating to safety and security) principally
through development assistance or through AEC funded contracts for
research and development.
Second, the pace of technological development and the breadth of
development interest have markedly been enlarged. Particular effort
has been directed toward promising fields; for example, nuclear power
reactors and radioisotopes for application in medicine and space.
The 1954 Act shifted the role of the Commission from exclusive
developer to promoter and co-participant-sponsor of private develop-
ment of peaceful uses of atomic energy; and shifted the posture of the
Commission in matters relating to health and safety from contract ad-
ministrator to regulator.
The Act spells out more clearly than the 1946 Act, the charter and
procedures of the Commission for facility and materials licensing, and
rests the charter squarely upon the interests of "common defense and
security" and "public health and safety," jointly.
The legislative history of the Act is silent on the question of pre-
emption. The silence, in the face of transference to private industry of
operating control of peaceful uses of atomic energy, has been the focal
point of comments on the scope of federal pre-emption. These com-
ments have not asked the question whether transference from one form
of regulation to another was inconsistent with the maintenance of a
comprehensive federal scheme. Rather, they have looked at the transfer
of development responsibility from government, to government and
industry jointly, as a surrender of a federal interest; and the establish-
ment of extensive licensing procedures as the initiation of a new federal
interest which needed to be weighed as a separate concern against the
states' interest in regulating public health and safety.65
Turning from the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
states have traditionally exercised licensing authority with regard to
three major classes of use of ionizing radiation: (1) naturally occurring
radioactive materials, principally radium and polonium; (2) x-ray
apparatus; and (3) research facilities such as accelerators, and the
radioactive material produced therein . 6
64 These include isotope users, fuel processors, utilities, reactor manufacturers,
mining and milling companies, etc.
65 See Staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Se-
lected Materials on Federal-State Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field,
283453 (Comm. Print 1959) and articles referenced therein; 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1008 (1964).66All of these came to be known before the beginning of the federal atomic
energy program. The commercial use of radium and the use of x-rays in
medicine had become extensive at the time the federal program was undertaken,
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Certain facts have emerged from the existing patterns of regula-
tion. There is extensive state interest in participating in the regulation
of atomic energy and in remaining aware of use of radioactive ma-
terial within the state. There has been a tremendous increase in the
number of users, types of users, and variety of material used, particu-
larly by-product material. And there is in evidence the need for trained
manpower at the local level and for a division of the responsibilities
between the states and the federal government in the interest of effective
regulation.
The importance of state co-operation and participation has been
accelerated by the tremendous rate of growth of use of radioactive ma-
terials. At the same time, the need for uniform and readily implemented
safety standards and regulations, for education and training programs,
and for adequately trained people has become pressing.
Recognizing the importance of effective co-operation between AEC
and the states, Congress amended the Act in 195967 to permit AEC "to
enter into agreements providing for discontinuance of [certain] regu-
latory authority of the Commission," thereby permitting exercise by the
states of exclusive regulatory authority in these areas.
The House and Senate Reports on the amendment make quite clear
that concurrent regulatory authority is not to be exercised :6s
It is not intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual
or concurrent jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards
by regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials.
The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed either
by the Commission, or by the State and local governments, but
not by both.
AEC may permit a state prepared to assume the responsibility69 to
exercise exclusive licensing authority over by-product, source, and spe-
cial nuclear material in quantities insufficient to form a critical mass,
with specific exceptions,70 and with the proviso that AEC find the state
program to be compatible with its program for regulation of such ma-
terials.71 AEC may re-assert jurisdiction if it finds such action is re-
quired to protect the public health and safety.7 2
At present, seventeen states have entered into agreements with
and the new federal program relied heavily upon the scientific discoveries that
were then being developed at research facilities. The failure to provide for
federal regulation of accelerator produced radioactive materials is particularly
difficult to explain, because the material is identical with reactor produced
byproduct material.
67 Public Law 86-373; Section 274 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1964).
682 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 2879 (1959).
69Atomic Energy Act §274d(1), 42 U.S.C. §2021d(1) (1964).
70 §274b, 42 U.S.C. §2021b (1964) ; §274c, 42 U.S.C. §2021c (1964).
71§274d(2), 42 U.S.C. §2021d(2) (1964).
72§274j, 42 U.S.C. §2021j (1964).
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AEC.7" A few states have refused to consider negotiations, because
they view an agreement as a surrender of authority they now have.74
While neither the Act nor its legislative history discusses pre-emp-
tion, the Act, on its face, demonstrates the intention that the federal
government, through AEC, be responsible for protecting public health
and safety from radiological hazards associated with the development
and use of atomic energy. The legislative history of the 1959 Amend-
ments establishing the state agreement program, by its extensive dis-
cussion of pre-emption,7 5 re-affirms the responsibility of AEC and
charges the Commission to undertake cooperative activities with the
states leading to the transference of certain regulatory authority. The
mechanism of transference forecloses the exercise of dual regulatory
authority. This suggests that dual regulation would hamper the de-
velopment of an ordered program for effective regulation of atomic
energy activities of particularly local impact. The states through co-
operation with AEC may better develop their informational resources,
education and personnel training opportunities, and standards and regu-
lations, and may better co-ordinate their program with AEC and with
other agreement states.
III. THE BASIS FOR FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
Reference has been made to the considerable comment in other
writings regarding the question, "has the federal government pre-empted
the field of regulating peaceful uses of atomic energy?"; and to the
fact that these analyses have searched the legislative history of the Act
in vain for specific indicia of such intent. It is suggested that there are
two questions that need be answered separately: (1) does a constitu-
tional basis exist that would support federal pre-emption? and (2)
does the pattern of the federal authority established indicate the exercise
of federal pre-emption?
Common defense and security were the underpinnings of the early
federal atomic energy programs. That Congress was not unaware of the
need for protection of public health and safety at the time of enactment
of the 1946 Act is incisively stated in the following excerpt from the
testimony of Dr. Vannever Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research
and Development, before the House Committee on Military Affairs :76
73 Ky., Miss., Calif., N.Y., Tex., Ark., Fla., N.C., Kan., Ore., Tenn., N.H., Ala.,
Nebr., Wash., Louisiana (effective May 1, 1967) and Arizona (effective May
15, 1967). Twenty other states have enacted statutory authorization to execute
agreements.
74 See, Report on Regulatory and Protective Measures Pertaining to Ionizing
Radiation within the Commonwealth, supra note 12.
75 See, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; See
Staff Committee Point, supra note 65.
76 Hearings Before the House Committee on Military Affairs on Atomic Energy,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 34 (1945).
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The application of the science of atomic energy is in its in-
fancy. No man can tell what may emerge from this vast new
field during the next generation. At the time that Faraday per-
formed his notable experiments on electricity no one could have
envisaged the great power systems and communication systems
of the present day. No one can tell what lies ahead in this present
field, but we can be sure that the opening up of this area gives
new possibilities for the human mind and that the ultimate re-
sults may indeed be very great.
On the other hand, there are no immediate great commercial
applications just around the corner. It is evident that there can
ultimately be applications to the production of power within the
reasonably near future, but the matter has not as yet been studied
sufficiently to indicate just how economical these may be in
comparison with other sources of power. Study by many minds
and a great deal of experimentation will be required before the
possibilities of industrial application ever become clear. The
situation in which we are placed at the present time, therefore,
is one of great potential importance, but one in which practical
results will certainly not come immediately.
Nevertheless it is essential that legislation be enacted at once
or with reasonable promptness for the Federal control of all
phases of atomic energy. This is an art which it is very dangerous
indeed to practice. Merely for the safety of the people it is es-
sential that it be carried on only under such strict regulation as
will insure that proper safeguards are always taken. This can
be done effectively only if the Federal Government establishes
new means for the purpose.
The 1954 Act charges the Commission to effectuate "a program to
encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent con-
sistent with the common defense and security and with the health and
safety of the public." 77
Long and tortuous arguments have been offered relating public
health and safety to common defense and security, and stressing the
impact of the atomic energy program upon interstate commerce, in
order to justify federal control over licensing uses of atomic energy
in the interest of public health and safety.78 These will not be repeated
here. This author cannot but conclude that there is constitutional basis
for a scheme of federal regulation of a program which is of major im-
portance to the nation and which potentially has a nationwide impact
on public health and safety.
The more difficult question is whether the scheme of federal action
indicates a necessity for excluding state action. It should be stated at
the outset that the power of the federal government to act includes the
77 42 U.S.C. 2013d (1964).
78 See, STASON, EsTEP & PIERcE, AToms AND THE LAW 1002 ET. SEQ. (1959); See
also articles referenced at footnote 65.
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power to preclude the states from acting.79 The question, then, is not one
of power, but of its exercise.
The power exercised by the federal government in the field of atomic
energy is broader than the charter granted AEC.80 Since we are here
concerned only with conflict over the exercise of licensing authority,
comment will be restricted to the scheme of licensing established in
the Act.
The scope of regulatory authority is co-extensive with that of the
1946 Act and therebefore. That is, it encompasses all use of atomic
energy to which private participation was invited by the 1954 Act or
in which such participation was permitted under the 1946 Act. AEC
has not sought to exercise authority in those areas which developed
apart from the federal atomic energy program.8'
Thus, there have been separate and distinct areas, albeit not logically
drawn, over which the states and the federal government have each
exercised exclusive regulatory authority. That is, the states have not
yet sought to challenge the areas wherein AEC has exercised authority,
and AEC has not attempted to broaden its authority into areas histori-
cally regulated by the states. The approaching conflict may take three
forms: (1) AEC chooses not to require a license for certain activity,
which the state then seeks to regulate; (2) AEC establishes a license
requirement or standard, which the state then seeks to implement or
elevate; and (3) the state chooses to exercise licensing authority inde-
pendent of AEC's licensing action.
For each conflict, competing interests will carry different weight
and will appear of more or less formidable posture, depending upon the
facts of the conflict. In the final analysis, it is the balance of these com-
peting interests and the evaluation of the impact of dual regulation of
the subject matter upon the federal program that should determine
whether the state action is inconsistent with the scheme of federal regu-
lation. It is to this judgment that the cases applying the Garmon
doctrine offer valuable precedent.
The case for broad scope of pre-emption
Since we have no power to thrust back in its bottle the jinni so
7 See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-1 (1955).80 Extensive activities are also conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service
through support to state programs and compilation and dissemination of
information; the Office of Civil Defense through maintenance of equipment
and installation and training of personnel to meet national emergency; the
Department of Labor in regard to employee radiation exposure and work-
men's compensation; the Department of Commerce regarding transportation
of radioactive materials; the Federal Radiation Council in regard to permis-
sible radiation exposure levels, and others. See Staff of the Joint Committee,
supra note 65, at 35-150.81 i.e., radium and polonium, x-ray apparatus, and accelerators and accelerator
produced radioactive materials.
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rashly uncorked, we have no choice but to attempt to controlit.s12
Two factors are of particular importance to a statement of the case for
broad federal pre-emption in the atomic energy field: (1) the very sub-
stantial responsibility to protect the public health and safety from the
hazards associated with the use of ionizing radiation is the result of
a complex technology, initially developed and controlled by the federal
government; and (2) the federal program directed at regulating the
utilization of the peaceful atom is the broadest and most comprehensive
program for protecting public health and safety against the hazards
associated with specific activities that has been attempted in the United
States.8 3
The first of these factors distinguishes the atom from the other
subject areas of pre-emption, because in those areas the competing
interests developed simultaneously. In growing, twentieth century
America, local regulation of commerce came to have an increasingly
substantial impact on interstate commerce; and labor-management rela-
tions evolved into multi-state proportions, while some aspects of these
relations remained peculiarly local in character.
The second factor indicates another difference between federal-
state relationship in the atomic energy area, and in those areas in which
state action has been tolerated in the interest of public health and safety.
That is, in precedent controversies, federal inaction in the subject area
was the basis for permitting state action. 4 In regulating the use of
atomic energy, the fact of conflict would presuppose the exercise of dual
regulatory authority.
Therefore, the case for defining broadly the scope of pre-emption
in the atomic energy field is at least as compelling as that which exists
in other areas of federal-state conflict related to public health and
safety.
The case against broad scope of pre-emption
The case against broad federal pre-emption is based upon four
arguments: (1) the interest of the state in public health and safety is
so important that the state is not to be precluded from exercising regu-
82 NEWMAN AND MILLER, THE CONTROL OF ATomIc ENERGY, 2 (1948).
83 See 45 N.C.L. Rv. 323 (1967); Berman and Hydeman, Staff of the Joint
Committee, supra note 65 at 373-4.84 As stated by the Supreme Court in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1959):
State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling
state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of
domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed con-
gressional direction. We recognize that the opinion in United Construction
Workers v. Laburnwm Corp., 347 U.S. 656, found support in the fact that
the state remedy had no federal counterpart. But that decision was deter-
mined, as is demonstrated by the question to which review was restricted,
by the "type of conduct" involved, i.e., "intimidation and threats of vio-
lence."
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latory authority; (2) there has been extensive state regulation in
particular areas; (3) uses to be regulated, other than those originating
under the federal program, present hazards which are substantial; and
(4) some areas of regulation are of local effect.
The issue is not so much one of precluding the state from regulating
as it is one of balancing the interests of an over-all program against
interests local in nature. The states are encouraged to participate in
AEC licensing proceedings.8 5 Procedure exists for petitioning the Com-
mission to amend its regulations." And the Act affords a basis for AEC
withdrawal from certain areas of regulation and for state assumption
of exclusive regulatory authority in these areas."7
The tradition of state licensing of radium, of x-ray equipment and
of accelerators and accelerator produced radioactive materials is a fact
of history. One cannot readily deny the tacit recognition of state action
in these areas. But this fact does not negate the existence of a defined
and extensive federal regulatory program.
That there are substantial hazards to be regulated other than those
developed under the federal program is forcefully expressed in the fol-
lowing excerpt from testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy on the federal-state cooperation amendment to the Act.,8
Representative DURHAM. It was brought out here yester-
day that 95 percent of the irradiation is coming from X-ray ma-
chines and all kinds of tools throughout the country, and only
5 percent of it is emanating from the atomic energy industrial
operation at the present time. So the States do have a great re-
sponsibility. We have never thought of controlling it at the
Federal level, such as telling a man how to use an X-ray ma-
chine....
Mr. HYDEMAN. There is no question that a considerable
part of the total radiation problem presently is a State responsi-
bility and with respect to X-rays my impression has been that
the medical and dental associations themselves have done a good
deal to educate their professions on the proper use and handling
of these devices. I suspect with such machines as X-rays that
the problem is much more a problem of education than it is of
regulation, and I think this is an area where the States have been
particularly good.
It is suggested that the cumulative magnitude of actual exposure
is not the basis for quantifying the need for regulation in the interest
83 10 C.F.R. §2.101(b) (1967), requires that the governor of the state in which
a facility is to be constructed be served by the applicant with a copy of the
application; and 10 C.F.R. §2.104(b) (1967), requires that AEC timely notify
the governor of the public hearing.
86 10 C.F.R. §2.802 (1967).
87 Atomic Energy Act §274, 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1964).
88 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 132
(1959).
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of public health and safety; rather, it is the degree of care that need
be exercised to minimize hazard from the proposed use. Some of the
federally-licensed activities involve complex hazard considerations call-
ing for design safeguards and safety research and development pro-
grams. Among the state licensed activities, training and education and
the implementation of procedures for the handling of materials are the
principal mechanisms for hazards minimization. 9
The need to develop safety technology implemented through uniform
regulatory practices requires a coordinated effort which might even
justify expanding the scope of federal regulation."
Finally, the predominantly local effect of some licensed uses is
recognized by all parties to make desirable certain regulation at the
state level. The question to be answered is whether over-all program-
matic considerations justify federal supervision of basic policies and
guidelines in this area.
The final section of this analysis will be devoted to applying these
considerations to an existing conflict.
IV. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF CONFLICT
The conflict posited in this discussion arises from the action of the
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin regarding the application of
Wisconsin-Michigan Power Company to build a nuclear power plant.91
The certificate (construction permit) placed two conditions upon de-
sign of the plant which were intended to improve the system's capability
to withstand the consequences of hypothetical accident situations. The
action may be viewed either as independent review by the state of
the adequacy of the design to protect public health and safety or as the
imposition of additional safety conditions to those of the federal pro-
ceeding.92 Even by assuming that the conditions of the certificate are
89 See remarks by Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, USAEC, before a Joint Session
of the Kentucky Legislature, AEC Press Release No. S-2-62, Feb. 9, 1962.
9o Of particular importance are the establishment of programs for training and
education of personnel throughout the country, the dissemination of up-to-date
information and statistics; and co-ordination of modification and amendment
to rules and regulations.91 The action of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission was discussed before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in hearings on the Licensing and
Regulation of Nuclear Reactors, April 4, 1967. The following excerpts from
the testimony should be noted:
Mr. Conway (Staff Director of the Committee): The point has been
made, at least the Commission's position has been, that the Federal
Government has pre-empted this area and hence the States do not have
the authority to pass laws or impose restrictions.
Mr. Price (AEC Director of Regulation) : So far as radiation safety
is concerned, that is right.
Mr. Conway: I think it does raise the question if various states start
imposing what they thought to be safety requirements and if they are
not in compliance with AEC and what we believe to be the more learned
area, it could have an adverse effect on safety.
Mr. Price: That is correct.
92An application for a construction permit is presently pending before AEC,
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compatible with the findings of the AEC licensing proceeding, the state
action cannot be upheld if the Atomic Energy Act envisions a compre-
hensive program of federal regulation of radiation hazards associated
with nuclear power plants.93
The legislative history of the Act does not tell us what posture the
AEC licensing program should have. The Act does tell us what AEC's
programmatic licensing responsibilities are.9 4 The needed insight may
be discerned by analysis of the effect of this dual exercise of regulatory
authority upon AEC's capability to comply with its charter.
Such approach requires familiarity with the AEC licensing pro-
cedures for nuclear power plants. There is an informal site evaluation
wherein the applicant discusses with AEC's regulatory staff the suit-
ability of the site or sites he is considering. This may occur before the
filing of an application for construction permit. He then submits to the
Commission a detailed description of the site selected and of the pro-
posed design for the facility.90 These are accompanied by an analysis of
the technical features of the project and evaluation of the adequacy
of the design."
The analysis is reviewed by the regulatory staff and by the inde-
pendent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS);98 the
regulatory staff then prepares its own safety analysis.99
A public hearing is conducted in the vicinity of the proposed project
by an atomic safety and licensing board.10 0 The public is invited to
attend and interested persons may participate as parties to the pro-
ceeding. 01 After the hearing the board renders an initial decision0 2
Docket No. 50-266. No action has yet been taken regarding the issuance of a
construction permit.
93 Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).94 Atomic Energy Act §3d, 42 U.S.C. §2013d (1964).
95 This step is not required by AEC regulations, but has been undertaken in
most cases because it is of mutual interest to both the applicant and the regu-
latory staff.
96 The description and accompanying analysis must encompass all subject areas
bearing upon protection of public health and safety; some of the more prom-
inent are reactor engineering, core physics, fluid dynamics, materials analysis,
thermodynamics, geology, seismicity, hydrology, structural analysis and health
physics; See 10 C.F.R. §50.34 (1967).
97 This evaluation includes analysis of- the effectiveness of engineered safeguards
to prevent accident and to limit the consequence of possible accident and of
the ability of the proposed design to withstand hypothetical accident conditions.
The ACRS is an independent body of 15 persons from outside AEC, each
expert in a technical discipline relating to reactor safety. The Act requires
ACRS review of the design of all power reactors. Atomic Energy Act
§29, 182b, 42 U.S.C. §2039 (1964) and §1826, 42 U.S.C. §2223b (1964). The
ACRS comments by letter upon the adequacy of the design. This letter is
introduced in evidence at the public hearing.
99 This safety analysis and the supporting submittals of consultants are the basic
evidence presented by the regulatory staff at the public hearing.
100 The board consists of 3 persons; two have technical expertise and the chair-
man is trained in law or administration. Atomic Energy Act §189a, 42 U.S.C.
§§223a, 2241 (1964).
301 See 10 C.F.R. §§2.104(b), 2.714 (1967).
102 See 10 C.F.R. §2.760 (1967).
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which is reviewed by the Commission on appeal or on its own initi-
ative. 10 3 Favorable disposition results in the issuance of a construction
permit.104
AEC inspectors visit the facility during construction;105 and upon
its completion, essentially the same review process is repeated except
that a public hearing is not mandatory for the issuance of an operating
license. 06
Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from this description
is that the AEC licensing procedures are multifaceted and costly. Indi-
vidual state departments of health are not in a position to undertake
this thoroughness of review. As the instant case exemplifies, the state
action focuses upon specific "problem areas" rather than stressing
over-all design.
Such an approach may imply a substantial cost penalty to the ap-
plicant, with, perhaps, little return in terms of over-all plant safety.
While cost is not a determinant in any formula for measuring adequacy
of design from a safety standpoint, to preclude cost evaluation in con-
sideration of safety alternatives is to purchase, at a high price, re-
sistance to design modification in the interest of safety. One cannot
stress too strongly, the importance of the manufacturer's co-operation
in assuring the proper regard for safety. However thorough the regu-
latory process, it cannot surmount the necessity for reliance upon the
manufacturer to keep updated the evaluation of his design and to in-
corporate the design specifications and quality control into the facility.
Having paid brief homage to what is perhaps the most important
aspect of a safety regulatory program, it is important to specify what
such a program should provide. Major objectives are to: (1) provide
technical competence; (2) maintain consistency of approach; (3) pro-
mote improvement of over-all design; (4) keep the public informed;
(5) inspect and enforce; and (6) afford appropriate safeguards.
1. Technical competence
The first necessity is for adequate staffing of persons trained in a
variety of disciplines and for the supply of support equipment. Not only
is this a costly process, but there is an acute shortage of highly skilled
personnel. Extensive use need be made of consultant experts; and there
must be in-house competence to prepare the subjects for study by con-
sultants and to evaluate their subjective and expert opinions.
If future staffing requirements are to be met, a far-reaching program
of training and education should be promoted and supported through
scholarships and grants.
203 See 10 C.F.R. §2.764 (1967).
104 Ibid.
105 10 C.F.R. §50.70 (1967).
106 42 U.S.C. §2239a (1964).
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There need be accumulated extensive informational sources, in-
cluding research papers, technical studies, material properties analyses
and test data, and reactor analyses and operating data.
Finally, these resources must be coordinated so that this competence
may effectively be utilized.
2. Consistency of approach
If each reactor was an entirely novel design, and was reviewed
without regard to the experience developed within the industry, it would
be difficult to justify design improvements. A language is needed for
comparing those concepts and designs which have been proof-tested
with the modifications proposed. The language is the expression of
technical support data through criteria, standards and codes. It needs
continuously to be up-dated, so that full advantage may be taken of
safety developments.
With a common language, reactor design, or aspects thereof, may
be standardized. This not only facilitates review of design adequacy,
but makes feasible more broadly based and substantial safety research
and development efforts.
To promote industrial interest in updated safety design, it is neces-
sary to provide an approach to reactor safety on which the industry may
place reliance in programming its development efforts. A consistent
approach is also needed with regard to support services, such as storage
and transportation of radioactive materials.
3. Improvement of over-all design
As design improvements are developed, it is important that they
be included in new reactors. This has resulted in some difficulty and
expense to utility applicants presently before AEC, who complain that
construction permits have been issued for other reactors of like design
without these additional features. There is not inherent in AEC's
position, the judgment that the reactors would be inadequately safe
without these features. Rather, the policy judgment has been made
that adequacy of design for safety requires the fullest feasible imple-
mentation of safety technology currently available. For this approach
to be workable, the implementor must have confidence in the integrity
of the proposer and must be satisfied that acceptance of the proposal
will not result in harrassment.17
107 That is, the implementor will not be subjected to unexpected and unreasonable
additional requirements, either at the federal or state level, if he acquiesces in
incorporating the suggested design modifications. The instant case illustrates
this point. The state reads of an idea for certain design improvements, perhaps
from letters of the ACRS, whose opinion is highly regarded both within and
without AEC. Reference is made to improved core spray systems in the
ACRS letters in Indian Point 2, Docket No. 50-247, Dresden 3, Docket
No. 50-249, Quad-Cities 1 and 2, Docket No. 50-254 and 50-265, and Palisades,
Docket No. 50-255; and to the "core-catcher" concept in Indian Point 2. The
state without having been privy to the philosophy behind the design modifica-
tions, establishes as conditions to the certificate, design modifications in these
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The difference between the above approach and the ad hoc addition
of "gadgets" should be emphasized. Increased redundancy is not always
synonymous with increased safety,10 8 and increased complexity may be
inconsistent with good design. 10 9
Coordination between the regulators and the design engineers per-
mits direction of safety development efforts toward maximum improve-
ment in over-all design. Toward this objective, there may now be
emerging cooperative efforts between AEC's regulatory staff and the
divisions of its management staff involved in research and development
efforts related to reactor safety,"l0 perhaps with industry participation;
and use might possibly be made of facilities and personnel at the na-
tional laboratories.
4. Public information
The public has a vital interest in the development of the nuclear
industry, both from the standpoint of insuring for its health and safety
and learning what benefits the atom may offer the community. Bringing
to the public the opportunity to see the magnitude of precautions taken
in licensing a nuclear power plant is possibly the most important
function of the AEC mandatory hearing requirement. Education of the
public, and stimulation of public interest in projects using the atom is
an important part, not only of promoting the development of atomic
energy, but of introducing responsible concern, other than that of
AEC and the equipment manufacturers and purchasers, into the licens-
ing formula. In this regard, it is particularly appropriate to encourage
state participation in the AEC licensing proceeding.
5. Inspection and enforcement
Adequately trained personnel and procedures for frequent and
thorough inspection of licensed facilities, coupled with enforcement
capability are essential support mechanisms for regulator-licensee co-
operation.":'
areas. Not only might this have a negative effect upon future manufacturer
co-operation in implementing design improvements, but it is not likely to
significantly improve design safety for the particular plant.
10 8 THOMPSON AND BECKERLY, I THE TECHNOLOGY OF NUcLEAR REACTOR SAFETY,
at 296-299 (1964).109 See remarks by Milton Shaw, Director, Division of Reactor Development
and Technology, USAEC, at the 1966 winter meeting of the American Nuclear
Society, Pittsburgh. Pa., November 2, 1966 entitled "AEC Views on Quality
Assurance in the Civilian Reactor Program."
110 See remarks by Commissioner James T. Ramey, USAEC, AEC Press Re-
lease No. IN-730, November 4, 1966, at 14-17 entitled "Quality Assurance as
a Matter of Public Policy in the Safety of Atomic Power Plants."
313 This cannot be accomplished without (1) programs for training and education
which teach the most up-to-date information and are available to the broadest
possible scope of inspector personnel; (2) effective enforcement resources in-
cluding investigations, support equipment and the means for getting to the
people and places in various parts of the nation that may be affected by a
license violation; and (3) the adoption of a strong, uniform approach as a
deterrent to license violation.
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6. Appropriate safeguards
Assurance against diversion of materials and data of importance to
national security, appropriate procedures regarding accountability for
radioactive materials, and prevention of disclosure of proprietary in-
formation, among others, are also important concerns of a regulatory
program.
To realize these objectives, a regulatory program needs also to scru-
tinize itself and to be capable of adjustment. Procedures should be
studied and modified so as to be responsible to the needs of an ad-
vancing technology, while promoting concern for public health and
safety. Rules and regulations continuously need revision or amend-
ment.
'OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is not intended to suggest that AEC has fulfilled all the objectives
stated in the Act. However, the AEC licensing program is a thorough
and energetic attempt to cope with an extremely complex, and increas-
ingly burdensome task.
Considerable effort and concern have been spent in attracting com-
petent technical personnel to the AEC program. This has not been an
easy task, since demand far exceeds supply. The Commission, through
support of university and special training programs, is attempting to
assure adequately trained staff support to meet increasing staffing re-
quirements.
A concentrated effort toward the development of criteria, standards
and codes is being undertaken. The regulatory staff was reorganized
in February, 1967 and a new division of reactor standards was estab-
lished. The information now being derived from review of the mark-
edly increased number of light water nuclear power reactors of similar
design will provide the needed experience for effective standards de-
velopment.
The desire for standardization and the mutual interest of AEC, the
manufacturers and the utilities in improved design have made possible
the exploration of new avenues for co-operative endeavors in research
and development relating to improved safety. Areas of particular inter-
est are earthquake resistant design, improved siting, and development
of engineered safeguards against loss of core coolant.
Finally, there has never been a radiation injury to a member of the
public resulting from the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed under
the AEC regulatory program.112 This impressive safety record, coupled
with the level of interest shown by the Commission and the industry
toward initiating design improvements in the interest of safety, and in
112 Testimony of James T. Ramey, Commissioner, USAEC, before the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Irrigation and
Reclamation on H.R. 207 and S. 270, February 28, 1967, transcript at 112.
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streamlining the AEC licensing procedures are the best indicia to date
of the effectiveness of the AEC regulatory program.
The foregoing is thought to demonstrate that independent state
licensing would retard the effectiveness of AEC in meeting its responsi-
bilities under the Atomic Energy Act. Where the AEC finds itself
limited by lack of resources or manpower, independent state licensing
authorities would be less well equipped. AEC-manufacturer-utility co-
operative efforts at design improvements and at standardization would
be hampered by the existence of dual regulation. The public would
likely see and understand less of the complexities of a reactor safety
program as a result of variegated proceedings. Proprietary information
might be compiomised, and the cost of the licensing process might
reach such proportions as to retard the development of this major new
resource.
It is concluded that the scheme of federal licensing established by
the 1954 Act necessitates preclusion of state regulation of radiation
hazards associated with nuclear power plants, if the objectives of the
Act are to be realized, and that the state does itself and the public a
disservice if it fails to provide a valuable contribution to the licensing
process through participation in the AEC proceeding.
The broader question as to the scope of exclusion of the states from
licensing action in the atomic energy field will not be answered here.
Suffice it to note that the primacy of federal licensing authority may
depend to a considerable extent upon the level of federal interest in the
licensed activity. This author believes that the program of AEC-state
agreements for transfer of jurisdiction is an effective and congression-
ally sanctioned expression of that interest.
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